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I. INTRODUCTION
The government of the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) has
announced its intention to make China a global leader in innovation by
2020.1 Many Chinese business leaders share this goal.2 The primary
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focus of this national strategy is to transform China into an exporter of
high-technology products based on Chinese designs rather than merely a
low cost, high volume manufacturer of products based on technology
developed in other countries.3 This paper will examine the implications
for this strategy with regard to the use of computerized management
information systems by Chinese businesses, and its relationship to recent
law reform efforts intended to promote greater use of electronic
commerce among Chinese businesses.
This paper considers three case studies of recent reforms of
P.R.C. commercial law in light of their contributions to this strategy, and
finds that the results so far are quite mixed. The first case study looks at a
domestic standard for accounting software issued in 1989 that
successfully removed obstacles to the greater use of computerized
accounting systems by local businesses and promoted the growth of the
domestic accounting software industry. The second and third case studies
involve P.R.C. legislation based on model laws developed by United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
developed to assist legislators in trading nations to harmonize their
national commercial laws in order to eliminate barriers to international
trade.4 The second case study looks at the inclusion of general electronic
commerce enabling legislation in the 1999 Contract Law which in theory
removed impediments to the use of electronic commerce by Chinese
businesses but in reality appears to be too abstract and general to provide
much certainty to parties wishing to form contracts using electronic
media. The third case study looks at the 2004 Electronic Signature Law
which promotes the use of a specific type of technology for
authentication. While it is too soon to know whether this law will achieve
its intended objectives in China, evidence from other countries with
similar laws suggests that it may not.
' Yang Lei, China Sets Goal for Developing Science, Technology in 15 Years, XINHUA, Feb. 9,
2006, available at http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-02/09/content_183774.htm (last visited May 8,
2007), referencing - 4 , ] [Guidelines on National Medium and
Long Term Planning for Science and Technology Development] (2006-2020), St. Council, XINHUA,
Feb. 9, 2006, at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm.
2 See, e.g., "Chinese companies must develop high technology and we must make our own technical
standards if we hope to change from 'made in China' to 'made by China."' Liu Qingtao, research
and development department of Lenovo Group, quoted in Zhao Xiaohui, Nation Strives for More
Say in Technical Standards, XINHUANET, May 14, 2005, at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-05/14/content_2956557.htm (last visited May 8, 2007).
3 See Richard P. Suttmeier & Yao Xiangkui, China's Post-WTO Technology Policy: Standards,
Software and the Changing Nature of Techno-Nationalism, NBR SPECIAL REP. No. 7, May 2004.
4 See Amelia H Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic Relationship Between International
and Domestic Law Reform, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1931 (1998).
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Given the global nature of information technology markets, it may
seem surprising that P.R.C. efforts to harmonize Chinese law with
electronic commerce laws enacted in other countries have only modest
prospects for success. Because Chinese businesses continue to struggle
with the challenges of transforming a centrally planned economy into a
market economy, their internal administrative systems often differ
significantly from or are less well developed than the administrative
systems of their counterparts in Western countries. This fact, together
with the fact that 1999 and 2004 electronic commerce law reforms appear
to have drawn heavily on foreign models, may explain why more recent
P.R.C. law reforms may never enjoy the success of the 1989 standards. It
does suggest, however, that government efforts to promote the use of
electronic commerce among local businesses will require much more than
transferring legislative models created for developed market economies to
transition economies such as China's if they are to succeed.
II. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
Although China's transition to a market economy has proceeded
at an astonishing pace over the last three decades, Chinese companies
today still face many significant administrative and regulatory
challenges. 5 P.R.C. government involvement in the economy is often
more extensive than it is even in other newly-industrialized East Asian
countries, and there may be fewer restraints on the exercise of discretion
by government officials. 6 Although Chinese policy of evolutionary
transition from a centrally planned to a market economy may have
avoided some of the worst excesses suffered by other former socialist
states such as Russia, Chinese businesses nevertheless find themselves
operating a very uncertain, dynamic institutional and regulatory
framework.7 Many institutions that are essential to the operation of a
market economy remain underdeveloped in the Chinese domestic
economy. For example, accountants qualified to apply the generally
accepted accounting standards of mature market economies rather than
5 See MINXIN PEI, CHINA'S TRAPPED TRANSITION 6-11 (2006).
6 See THOMAS G. MOORE, CHINA IN THE WORLD MARKET: CHINESE INDUSTRY AND
INTERNATIONAL SOURCES OF REFORM IN THE POST-MAO ERA 287 (2002); LIN YIMIN, BETWEEN
POLITICS AND MARKETS: FIRMS, COMPETITION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN POST-MAO CHINA
198 (2001).
7 See ANDREW H. WEDEMAN, FROM MAO TO MARKET: RENT SEEKING, LOCAL PROTECTIONISM
AND MARKETIZATION IN CHINA 12 (2003).
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those of centrally planned economies are in short supply. 8 Chinese firms
make relatively little use of the kind of sophisticated software used by
their competitors in developed economies to improve their management
systems because the internal administrative structures of Chinese firms
differ from those of the Western companies for whom much of the
software was developed. 9 In addition, Chinese managers often lack a
clear understanding of what management information systems do and
how they might benefit from implementing them; furthermore, because
labor costs are lower than in the West, Chinese firms are not under the
same pressure to replace employees with technology as their Western
competitors. 10 While tremendous strides have been made in expanding
China's judicial system, courts suffer from serious shortages in funding,
judges often lack professional training, and the judicial system as a whole
remains under the shadow of its political masters." The legal profession,
like the accounting profession, is far from mature: for example, in the
early 2000s, it was estimated that only about forty percent of China's
lawyers had received a college education.1 2 Under these circumstances, it
is not surprising that many Chinese businesses have not yet embraced
electronic commerce.
While Chinese businesses in the past have been able to compete
in global markets because their lower labor or regulatory compliance
costs permitted them to undercut competitors in developed economies, if
they are going to compete in the future based on innovation and superior
technology, greater use of electronic commerce will be essential.
Electronic commerce technologies can benefit the companies that adopt
them by reducing administrative overhead costs, by improving
communications and marketing, and by providing management with
better knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of company operations,
better information about market conditions, and better tools for
collaboration with trading partners. There are costs associated with
gaining these benefits, however. The most obvious is the initial cost of
8 Barney Jopson, Accounting in China: Number-Crunchers Line Up for Boot Camp, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 2006, at 8.
9 See AnnaLee Saxenian, Government and Guanxi: Chinese Software Industry in Transition, in THE
SOFTWARE INDUSTRY IN EMERGING MARKETS (Simon Commander ed., 2005).
10 See Deng Qin, Inside the Chinese ERP Market, AMR RES. REP., Sept. 2005; Deng Qin, Profile of
China's Manufacturing Community, AMR RES. REP., Dec. 2005.
11 Zhang Qianfan, The People's Court in Transition: The Prospects for Chinese Judicial Reform, in
DEBATING POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA: RULE OF LAW VS. DEMOCRATIZATION 139 (Zhao
Suisheng ed., 2006).
12 Cai Yonghsun & Yang Songcai, State Power and Unbalanced Legal Development in China, in
DEBATING POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA: RULE OF LAW VS. DEMOCRATIZATION 165 (Zhao
Suisheng ed., 2006).
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acquiring the technology, including hardware and software. In addition,
there may be substantial costs associated with implementing new
technologies. 13 These implementation costs may include the cost of
switching processes from human to computerized administration, and of
customizing different programs to permit them to interoperate.' 4 Once
business processes have been computerized, then businesses need to
adopt information security policies to safeguard company assets housed
inside computer systems, notwithstanding the cost and difficulty of
implementing such policies. 15
To assist in the analysis in this paper, electronic commerce
technologies will be organized into two general groups: basic and
advanced. Basic electronic commerce technologies include the use of e-
mail in lieu of postal mail, telexes or faxes, the design of simple Web
sites for marketing, and the utilization of basic productivity applications
such as spreadsheets to monitor company processes. The popular Alibaba
website provides an example of how basic electronic commerce
applications are being used effectively by Chinese businesses. Foreign
companies wishing to source goods and services in China can use the
Alibaba website to identify local Chinese businesses that might be able to
meet their needs, and to learn about the reputation of those businesses.
The Alibaba site lowers the cost of searching the Chinese market for
potential trading partners and of negotiating contracts, but has not
provided tools for collaborative production after a contract has been
formed. In 2007, Alisoft, one of Alibaba Group's companies, released its
first software product, a piece of Web-based business software.16 This is
part of a larger strategy of providing advanced as well as basic
electronic commerce technologies to its members.17
13 see MICHAEL CUSUMANO, THE BUSINESS OF SOFTWARE (2004).
14 Only about half of the companies in developed economies that try to implement sophisticated
electronic commerce systems succeed because many managers fail to recognize how difficult it is to
implement them correctly and to allocate enough resources to the process. Kishore Kanakamedala,
Glenn Ramsdell & Vats Srivatsan, Getting Supply Chain Software Right, I MCKINSEY Q. 78
(2003).
15 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CYBERSECURITY TODAY AND TOMORROW: PAY NOW OR PAY
LATER (2002).
16 V#R]j " jj-A, [Alisoft Releases Its First Electronic Commerce Software], Ni
:14tr [NEW WAVE SCIENCE], Apr. 13, 2007, available at http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2007-04-
13/12461464530.shtml (last visited May 14, 2007).
17 Pq= E. E * 1Hi * F A*A, [Alibaba to Introduce Free Electronic Commerce
Processing Solution], CNET NEWS, Apr. 18, 2006, at
http://www.cnetnews.com.cnlnews/netlstory/0,3800050307,39445704,00.htm (last
visited May 12, 2007).
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Advanced electronic commerce technologies include the use of
enterprise resource management software within firms and the use of
information technology to promote seamless cooperation among trading
partners within a supply chain in order to achieve "lean production."
Advanced electronic commerce technologies play an essential role in such
business management systems as integrated supply chains, value chain
systems, virtual organizations, virtual enterprises, collaborative networks,
inter-organizational systems, and extended enterprises. For China to
achieve its goals for economic growth through technological leadership,
Chinese businesses will need to learn to use advance electronic commerce
technologies with domestic as well as foreign trading partners.
Because China is a country with a plentiful supply of labor, and
relatively low penetration rates for new information technologies,
Chinese businesses are more likely to use basic electronic commerce
technologies than advanced, especially when dealing with other domestic
Chinese firms. One of the primary motivations among firms in developed
countries behind the use of electronic commerce technologies is to reduce
dependence on expensive labor. In China, by contrast, where unskilled
labor is plentiful but workers with knowledge of sophisticated
information technology may be in short supply, labor-intensive manual
administrative procedures may still be less expensive than new
technologies that computerize those processes. A small number of
Chinese firms who have close trading relationships with large foreign
firms may use advanced electronic commerce technologies when dealing
with their foreign trading partners because the foreign trading partner
requires it. However, there is not much evidence that advanced electronic
commerce technologies have yet been adopted widely within the
domestic Chinese economy. Chinese companies that have successfully
integrated new information technologies into their business processes are
most likely to be using basic technologies such as e-mail for
communications, and Web sites for marketing. 18
For China to achieve its economic policy objective of moving
beyond high volume, low cost labor-intensive production based on
18 Saxenian, supra note 9, at 22 (quoting one software consultant, "in today's China, you can find
$30 billion multinationals with virtually no IT functionality besides e-mail and a marketing
website"); see also Deng Qin, Inside the Chinese ERP Market, supra note 10; Deng Qin, Profile of
China's Manufacturing Community, supra note 10 (electronic commerce technologies widely in use
among companies in developed countries include "customer relationship management" (CRM)
systems, "materials requirement planning" (MRP) systems, "enterprise resource management"
(ERM) systems and "knowledge management" systems). See also KENNETH C. LAUDON & JANE P.
LAUDON, MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS: MANAGING THE DIGITAL FIRM 7 (8th ed. 2004)
(use of accounting software is widespread among Chinese firms today, but use of more advanced
forms of software is not).
420 [20:2
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE IN CHINA
technologies developed outside China to becoming a source of
innovations that define the terms of trade in global markets, Chinese
businesses will have to move from basic to advanced electronic
commerce technologies. This is because advanced electronic commerce
technologies play an important role not just in supporting the invention of
new technologies, but also in providing a framework within which those
technologies are successfully commercialized and marketed. '9 The
complexity of producing and implementing innovative technologies is so
great that few organizations can manage these challenges without the help
of collaborative relationships formed with trading partners. The
development of the new Boeing 787 airplane is an example of successful
innovation within a framework of collaborative relationships among
Boeing and its suppliers: Boeing is now relying on its trading partners not
just for production of parts that it has designed, but to assist in strategic
research and development. 20 Many experts in developed countries
believe that this kind of collaboration is often essential to helping a firm
succeed in global competition, and such collaboration is not possible
without the use of advanced electronic commerce technologies.2 1
In the three case studies that follow, Chinese law reforms
designed to promote greater use of information technology among
domestic businesses will be evaluated in terms of whether they promote
the use of basic or advanced electronic commerce technologies. Using
this standard to evaluate recent P.R.C. electronic commerce law reforms
allows the impact of those law reforms to be assessed in light of their
relationship to China's overarching goal of competing in global markets
based on technological innovation.
III. PROMOTING THE USE OF ACCOUNTING SOFTWARE
The foundation of advanced electronic commerce is the
automation of administrative processes within firms. The quantity and
quality of information that can be exchanged with trading partners will be
limited if a firm has not automated its internal administrative systems.
Managers cannot develop a sophisticated grasp of conditions in domestic
'9 See EDWARD W. DAVIS & ROBERT E. SPEKMAN, THE EXTENDED ENTERPRISE: GAINING
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE THROUGH COLLABORATIVE SUPPLY CHAINS (2004).
20 Richard L. Nolan & Suresh Kotha, Boeing 787: The Dreamliner (Harvard Business School Case
Compilation 9-305-101), June 21, 2005.
21 See, e.g., Ge Dongsheng & Takahiro Fujimoto, Quasi-Open Product Architecture and
Technological Lock-In: An Exploratory Study on the Chinese Motorcycle Industry, 3 ANNALS OF
BUS. ADMIN. SCI. 15-24 (2004) (suggesting that innovation based in collaborative networks in
China's motorcycle industry is limited to production efficiencies and not product innovation).
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and global markets without at the same time having a sophisticated grasp
of conditions within their own firms. The first case study focuses on a
successful legal reform that provided Chinese firms with important
incentives to adopt computerized accounting systems. Accounting
software is a primary enabling technology that supports companies' use
of both basic and advanced electronic commerce technologies.
China's software industry as a whole is underdeveloped and not
globally competitive because it consists of thousands of small and
undercapitalized firms.22 The products of foreign software developers
dominate the market for software in China, although in many cases, this is
due to rampant piracy rather than successful marketing by foreign firms.
By contrast, within the market for accounting software in China, domestic
firms account for ninety percent of the software in use. The software is
produced by several large, well-capitalized software development firms
including UFSoft and Kingdee. Accounting software companies are
considered leaders in China's software industry. 23 The success of this
industry segment is attributable to the fact that Chinese companies are
required to follow Chinese accounting practices, aspects of which differ
from accounting practices in other countries, and to the fact that nearly 20
years ago, the P.R.C. government enacted regulations that successfully
provided local businesses with concrete incentives to use software to
prepare their accounts.
The development of the Chinese accounting software industry
dates back to the end of the 1970s when the P.R.C. government began to
implement the strategy of "accounting computerization" throughout the
country. Part of this policy included issuing regulations aimed at
promoting the use of accounting software by Chinese firms. In 1989, the
Ministry of Finance (MOF) issued the Interim Regulations on
Management of Accounting Software,24 also called the Xu Shi Tiao by the
accounting software industry.25 The Xu Shi Tiao are regarded as the
foundation of China's domestic accounting software industry even though
they were not the first example of P.R.C. government regulations
designed to promote greater use of computers in the industry. In 1987,
22 See generally Saxenian, supra note 9.
21 See )IJIWIP, [ - fjfH [Liu Guohua, Why Domestic Accounting
Software Dominates 90% of the Chinese Market], ERP WORLD NET, Dec. 1, 2003, at
http://www.erpworld.net/2003/content.php?ID=83 11 (last visited May 8, 2007).
24 ( (i'4T) [Regulations on Management of Accounting Software
(Interim)] (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin., Dec. 9, 1989) (P.R.C.).
25 The t, [Xu Shi Tiao], or "Ten Articles of Xu," were named after Xu Jiangang, director of the
Computerization Division, Fiscal Department of P.R.C. Ministry of Finance, who was in charge of
national accounting computerization and was the main drafter of the Xu Shi Tiao.
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the MOF issued Provisions on Financial Issues During the Promotion of
Computers at State-Owned Enterprises. 26 This regulation provided to
state-owned enterprises favorable rules governing the amortization of
costs of acquiring computer hardware, but did not include any equivalent
rules governing the use of software. This regulation did not address the
issues of the high cost of acquiring accounting software, of whether
computerized accounting systems were at least as reliable as manual
accounting systems in maintaining essential financial controls, or of
whether regulators would accept the output of accounting programs as
readily as accounting records prepared using traditional processes.
The Xu Shi Tiao were more successful in promoting the growth of
China's accounting software industry than the earlier regulation
governing amortization of computer hardware acquisition costs because it
simultaneously addressed all three of those issues. It promoted greater
standardization among accounting programs which made products
available at lower costs, established minimum standards for reliability of
accounting software, and also clarified under what conditions tax
authorities would accept company accounting records prepared using
such software. Both provisions provided improvements over a 1979
MOF pilot project, where RMB five million was allocated to develop
accounting software at First Automobile Works (FAW).27  From its
inception through 1988, the application of accounting software was not as
successful as the MOF had expected. From September 1988 to January
1989, the MOF conducted an investigation to discover what was
undermining the success of-the project. The investigation was not limited
to the situation at FAW, but included analyses of accounting software
needs at firms all over the country. The results of the investigation
showed that most firms using accounting software were using custom
developed programs that were too specifically tailored to the individual
needs of one firm to be usable by other firms.28 Customized software has
26 q1 1 J -vj ~.izft JL~ ' - [Provisions on Financial
Issues During the Promotion of Computers at State-Owned Enterprises] (Promulgated by the
Ministry of Fin., Sept. 8, 1987) CHINALAWINFO (last visited Dec. 21, 2006) (P.R.C.).
27 FAW, established on July 15, 1953, laid the foundation for the Chinese automobile industry, and
is considered the guiding figure of China's automobile industry. See FAW's website at
http://www.faw.com/webcontent/index.jsp.
28 The heavy reliance on custom development rather than mass distribution of standardized
applications is characteristic of the early stages of development of the software industry in many
countries, including China. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER SOFTWARE INDUSTRY:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDUSTRY EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE (David C. Mowry ed., 1996);
-- -", 21 ±[ , . . fl l1 tk A' I [Xin Yunyong, The Past and Present Incarnations of
Domestic Accounting Software], Uii09F [THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY], Jan. 25, 2004, available
at http://news.chinabyte.com/343/1763843.shtml (last visited May 8, 2007).
2007) 423
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ASIAN LAW
several disadvantages compared to standardized "off the shelf' software,
including a lengthy and slow development process, higher acquisition
costs, and higher maintenance costs.2 9 The MOF investigation showed
that there was considerable demand among Chinese firms for affordable
standardized applications, but that managers of firms were concerned
about the reliability of software accounting systems, and about whether
accounting records produced using computerized accounting systems
would be acceptable to tax authorities. After analyzing these findings, the
MOF began working with industry representatives to draft a regulation
that would promote greater standardization, lower licensing costs, and set
minimum reliability standards that in turn would allow financial
regulators to accept financial information from enterprises produced using
accounting software.
In 1989, the MOF issued the Xu Shi Tiao, establishing ten
requirements governing, among other software development issues,
standards for writing code, entering and securing data, and correcting data
entry errors. 30 These requirements were established through the
cooperative efforts of developers, users, and regulators of this technology.
Businesses that wanted to prepare their accounts using software were
required to use software that had been certified compliant with the Xu Shi
Tiao. By 1998, thirty-eight commercial accounting software programs
had been so certified, and one hundred sixty programs had been certified
compliant with the requirements of provincial financial departments.
31
As Xu Jiangang, primary architect of the regulations, noted:
To accounting software companies, certification
makes the users trust their software. To some
extent, these companies freely enjoyed the
intangible property of the MOF. That benefits both
software companies and end users. At the
beginning of the 1990s, software was not familiar to
the users, let alone commercial software.
Certification promoted the application of
commercial accounting software and finally
29 See CUSUMANO, supra note 13.
3 0 The ten provisions are available listed in RRA, ft-Vk'r: -"k~iI [Wu
Shaowei, Accounting Software: The Emergence of a Set of Standards and of an Industry],
http://www2.ccw.corn.cn/04/0426/g/0426g0428.asp (last visited May 28, 2007).
31 VFI., i+±#-- L-[ J [Xu Jiangang, A Decade of Accounting Software], q, 1MitfN#tfJ -
fi & N a ' . [CHINA COMPUTER WORLD PUBLISHING],
http://www.ccw.com.cn/htm/newsl/topic/01-2-26-70.asp (last visited May 8, 2007).
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promoted the development of the accounting
software industry. This explains why China's
accounting software industry developed rapidly
during 1990s.32
Part of the success of the Xu Shi Tiao is due to the fact that they are
performance standards, not design standards, so competing software
companies could develop unique products that would meet the
standards, providing end users with a range of choices. Soon after the
issuance of the Xu Shi Tiao, hundreds of thousands of businesses
purchased accounting software programs and converted their
traditional manual accounting management processes to computerized
accounting systems.33
In 1994, the new Provisions on Necessary Functions of
Accounting Software34 were issued to replace the Xu Shi Tiao. These
Provisions built on those of the Xu Shi Tiao, but added thirty
supplemental requirements to the original ten. In 1999, as a result of
internal administrative changes at the MOF, the requirement that software
be independently reviewed and certified prior to being marketed as
compliant with the Xu Shi Tiao was suspended, and a system allowing
software developers to self-certify was instituted in its place.35 However,
by the time the independent certification requirement was suspended, a
vigorous market for accounting software programs was well established,
and company managers no longer looked to the MOF to control access to
the market for accounting software programs. The market failure the Xu
Shi Tiao addressed had been corrected because businesses now had the
sophistication to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of various
software programs, and the confidence that their accounting records
maintained within computerized systems would be acceptable to
regulators.
32 pit, IFQV: : Wif, Z j :-$ [He Shi, Xu Jiangang: Evaluating Affairs of the Past], ERP It
R-l [ERP WORLD NET], Jan. 9, 2004, http://news.erpworld.net/content.php?ID=9164 (last visited
May 8, 2007).
33 Id.
3 it* / ijh [Provisions on Necessary Functions of Accounting Software]
(promulgated by the Ministry of Fin., Jun 1, 1994, effective July 1, 1994) (P.R.C.).
35 See Xin, supra note 28.
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IV. REMOVING OBSTACLES TO ELECTRONIC
CONTRACTING
The 1970s saw worldwide efforts to establish standards for
formatting data in contracts so that businesses could exchange drafts in
electronic form. These efforts produced "electronic data interchange"
(EDI) standards in the 1980s, including the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X12 standards,
as well as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UN/ECE) standard EDI for Administration, Commerce and Transport
(EDIFACT), later adopted by the International Organization for
Standards (ISO) as an international standard. Based on these standards,
sophisticated electronic contracting applications have been developed and
are now in use by hundreds of thousands of organizations around the
world. Once businesses have EDI contracting systems in place with their
trading partners, they are able to streamline their communications and
increase the efficiency of their interactions. However, EDI contracting
systems are notorious for being expensive to implement and difficult to
maintain, and as a result, have not been popular with small and medium-
sized enterprises in developed countries, or any local enterprises in
36developing countries. 6 Many multinational corporations that source
products in China require their Chinese trading partners to use EDI
contracting systems, but outside of exporting firms enjoying direct
relationships with foreign multinationals, few businesses in China use
them.
For companies in developing countries to make the transition
from basic electronic commerce technologies to advanced ones, some
means of lowering the cost of using sophisticated electronic contracting
systems must be found. The growing popularity of the Internet as a
medium of communication for electronic commerce contributed to
interest in an Internet-based model of sophisticated business-to-business
(B2B) electronic contracting that would be as effective as EDI but easier
to use and less expensive to implement. Work has been underway since
the 1990s to develop new standards to promote their growth of these new
models, generally referred to as Web services.37 The 1990s and 2000s
saw the development of standards for new Web services B2B electronic
contracting systems based on "eXtensible Markup Language" (XML)
36 BRIAN GIBB & SURESH DAMODARAN, EBXML: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATION (2003).
37 DOUG KAYE, LOOSELY COUPLED: THE MISSING PIECES OF WEB SERVICES (2003) (arguing that
Web services will permit the move from expensive, complex, brittle advanced electronic commerce
systems to less expensive, more flexible systems based on "loosely coupled" modular information
systems).
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technology. The Organization for the Advancement of Structured
Information Standards (OASIS) and the United Nations Centre for Trade
Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT) jointly developed
"ebXML" standards for XML electronic contracting, which were
accepted as ISO standards in 2004. Web Services B2B systems based on
ebXML or similar standards may make it possible for more enterprises in
developing countries, and for small and medium-sized enterprises around
the world, to form collaborative supply chains with their trading partners
and compete more effectively in global markets.
Even if it becomes less expensive to acquire and maintain B2B
electronic contracting technologies, businesses will be reluctant to make
the switch from traditional administrative processes to electronic
commerce if they think it would make their contracts unenforceable. To
reduce the number of legal obstacles to the use of electronic contracting
technologies in cross-border trade, UNCITRAL developed the Model
Law on Electronic Commerce.38 UNCITRAL is an organization that
develops model laws and standard documents to facilitate international
commercial transactions. Among its undertakings, UNCITRAL has
produced the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers,
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The global scope of electronic
commerce makes UNCITRAL an obvious and logical forum for
developing consensus regarding the identification of appropriate reforms
in existing contract law to facilitate the continued expansion of electronic
contracting.
In 1984, UNCITRAL first identified the need for law reform in
the area of cross-border trade and electronic contracts in a report by the
Working Party on Facilitation of International Trade Procedures, and in
1988, the Working Party on Electronic Data Interchange was formed.39
After nearly a decade of work by the Working Party, the Model Law was
approved by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1996.
The language of the Model Law reflects its initial inspiration, which was
to remove obstacles to EDI contracting. Language in the draft was
modified in an attempt to make it more generally applicable to electronic
commerce conducted using either older EDI systems or newer Web-based
systems. The drafters of the model law made every effort not to endorse
any particular technology, but to maintain a "technology neutral"
38 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, U.N. Doc E.99.V.4 (1996), at
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/electroniccommerce/1996Model.html.
39 Boss, supra note 4, at 1950.
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approach to commercial transactions by focusing on the principle of
"functional equivalence" between paper and electronic documents.
The Model Law applies only to "data messages" used in
commercial transactions, and does not override consumer protection
laws. 40 The term "data message" includes information generated, sent,
received or stored in electronic form, including EDI messages, e-mail, or
faxes. 41 The heart of the Model Law is found in Article Five, which
provides that information shall not be denied legal effect, validity, or
enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the form of a data
message. A data message may meet the legal requirement of a "writing"
provided that it is in a format which may be accessed for subsequent
reference.42 A data message can meet the legal requirement of a signature
if a method is used to identify a person and indicate the person's approval
of the contents of the message, and that method is as reliable as
appropriate under the circumstances.43 A data message may also meet the
legal requirement that an original document be presented or retained." A
data message shall not be excluded from evidence in a legal proceeding
solely on the grounds that it is electronic or is not in its original form.45
Record-retention requirements may be met by retention of data messages,
provided the information they contain may be accessed for subsequent
reference, they can be demonstrated to represent accurately the
information that was stored, and if possible, the provenance of the data
message can be demonstrated.46
Since 1996, the Model Law on Electronic Commerce has been
enacted in full in the overseas territories of the United Kingdom and in
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China. Legislation
implementing part of the Model Law has been enacted in Australia,
China, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, India,
Ireland, Jordan, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama,
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri
Lanka, Thailand and Venezuela. In the United States, the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (E-SIGN
Act)47 and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, a model law that has
40 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, supra note 38, Art. 1.
41 Id. Art. 2(a).
42 Id. Art. 6(1).
43Id. Art. 7(1).
44 Id. Art. 8.
4 Id. Art. 9.
461 Id. Art. 10.
41 15 U.S.C.S. § 7001 (2007).
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been enacted in almost every state, include provisions based on the Model
Law.48
In 1999, China's new unified Contract Law took effect, replacing
what had formerly been three separate laws covering domestic economic
contracts, foreign-related economic contracts, and technology contracts.49
The 1999 Contract Law was designed both to address the growing
sophistication of China's market economy, and to remove obstacles to the
use of new technology. With regard to whether a contract must be
reduced to writing and signed in order to be enforceable, the Contract
Law took a more flexible approach than the statutes that preceded it.
Article Ten of the Contract Law provides that, unless a form requirement
is imposed by other law, a contract may be oral, in writing or in other
forms, which reduces contract formalities to an evidentiary consideration
rather than a substantive requirement. 50 Several of the provisions
regarding new technology took their inspiration from the provisions of the
Model Law, although they are not simple copies of the language in the
Model Law. The new Contract Law contains several provisions that
address the use of electronic media in the formation of contracts,
including the definition of what constitutes a "writing,",5' defining an
offer to include electronic messages, 52 and defining when and where a
contract is formed by means of electronic messages. 3 The P.R.C.
legislation that was inspired by the Model Law honors the principles of
functional equivalence and technology neutrality, and thus fulfills the
aims of the Model Law by removing obstacles to electronic commerce
without introducing any new, technology-specific regulation.54
It is possible that the electronic commerce enabling provisions of
the Contract Law have made Chinese businesses more willing to use
basic electronic commerce technologies such as e-mail and Web sites to
form contracts. Given the relative lack of sophistication of electronic
contracting technologies used by Chinese businesses, disputes involving
48 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act, at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-
fs-ueta.asp (last visited May 8, 2007).
49 ZHANG MO, CHINESE CONTRACT LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 7-8 (2006); John H. Matheson,
Convergence, Culture and Contract Law in China, 15 MINN. J. INT'L L. 329 (2006).
50 ZHANG, supra note 49, at 112.
"' rP * , [0 - -VA [Contract Law of the People's Republic of China] Art. 11 (promulgated
by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999) (P.R.C.).
52 Id. Art. 16.
3 Id. Art. 33 & Art. 34.
54 Gao Fuping, The E-Commerce Legal Environment in China: Status Quo and Issues, 18 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 51 (2004).
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electronic commerce are likely to arise in the context of contracts
allegedly formed by exchange of e-mails or by using a Web-based
graphical user interface ("click-through") contracting system. 55 To prove
the existence of such a contract and its terms, the parties will be required
to submit evidence created and stored on computers. Under U.S. law, a
party seeking to introduce such evidence is required to prove how the
record was created, and that it was stored under conditions that permit the
court to rely on the information it contains. 6
Under P.R.C. law, evidence is classified into seven traditional
types, 57 but e-mail and other forms of electronic evidence are difficult to
classify within the established categories of evidence. Given the current
uncertainty with regard to the application of existing evidence law to new
forms of electronic evidence, the local parties may feel concerned that a
P.R.C. court would be reluctant to accept e-mails or log files showing
online interactions as evidence that a contract was formed. The
provisions of the new Contract Law are too abstract and general to
provide concrete guidance to local courts and local litigating parties in
how to evaluate such forms of evidence. Furthermore, temporary
guidance issued by the P.R.C. Supreme Court to local courts in 2001
regarding the admissibility of evidence (Evidence Guidelines) actually
counsels local courts to be skeptical of electronic media such as videos,
and this guidance could be interpreted by local courts as encouraging
skepticism about other forms of electronic evidence as well.58
" See, e.g., M/[M v A AM [Miss Yang v. Ebay China] (Shanghai Hongkou District People's Ct.),
discussed in PqT_ & igiM a, , [Zhao Hong & Zhu Dahe,
Online Purchaser of Fake Goods Refuses Compensation from Company], Vi R [SHANGHAI
MORNING POST], Dec. 10, 2002, at
http://law.eastday.com/epublish/gb/paper26/20021210/class002600002/hwz593436.htm (last visited
May 8, 2007) (holding website providing "online shopping mall" has "some" responsibility for
checking the authenticity of products sold on its platform, although it is not in privity with the
buyer-seller transactions it facilitates).
56 See generally JANE K. WINN & BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE §
20.05 (4th ed. 2007) (authentication of electronic evidence); American Exp. Travel Related Servs.
v. Vinhnee (In re Vinhnee), 336 B.R. 437 (Bankr. Fed. App. 2005) (claim by American Express in
bankruptcy court was dismissed after printouts of customer account statements were offered as
evidence with only vague, conclusory, and unpersuasive testimony to authenticate them).
17 q K _yL [K iffj jj [Civil Procedure Law of the P.R.C.] Art. 63 (promulgated by the
Nat'l People's Cong., May 9, 1991) (P.R.C.) (documentary evidence; material evidence; audio-
visual material; testimony of witnesses; statements of the parties; expert conclusions and records of
inspection).
5 :I% f $ iliIFAl [Rules of Evidence in Civil Procedures] "ff
[2001] 33 - [Legal Explanation No. 33] § 22 (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Dec. 6, 2001,
effective Apr. 1, 2002) (P.R.C) (requiring provider of electronic data to provide the original carrier
of data or if not feasible then report of outline of how reproduction was secured: "The investigators
who investigate and collect computer data or audio and visual materials, such as sound recordings
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It is not yet clear how Chinese courts will handle evidence offered
in electronic contract disputes in light of the Evidence Guidelines.
Anecdotal evidence of decisions in urban areas suggests that at least some
courts are doing a reasonably good job of distinguishing between reliable
and unreliable electronic evidence. The first reported case involving the
application of the Evidence Guidelines to electronic evidence was decided
in 2002.59 In that case, the publisher of a book describing a computer-
assisted categorization system sued another publisher that had released
the same text on a CD. The defendant claimed that the work lacked the
requisite originality to be copyrightable. In 2003, the Beijing Number
One Intermediate People's Court applied Articles Ten and Eleven of the
new Contract Law to hold that a "clickwrap" contract formed by a
subscriber to Sina.com's free e-mail service was a valid contract.
60
In another case, widely discussed in the media, a Beijing court
was asked to decide who had sent an e-mail in light of circumstantial
evidence provided by network administrators. 61 The case involved two
graduate students at Beijing University who, together with several other
graduate students, had access to an e-mail account registered in the name
of an academic mentor. One of the graduate students received an offer of
admission and a scholarship to attend the University of Michigan, but
someone who was logged on to the mentor's e-mail account sent an e-
mail to declining the offer, so the scholarship was awarded to another
student before the intended recipient realized what had happened. The
intended recipient sued a fellow graduate student who had been using the
mentor's e-mail account at the time that the e-mail declining the offer was
sent. Although the case was resolved through conciliation, evidence was
taken regarding whether the computer from which the e-mail was sent
and visual recordings, etc., shall request the investigated person to provide the original device
installing the relevant data. If it is too difficult to provide the original installation device, its
duplicate may be provided. In case of providing duplicates, the investigators shall record the
sources of the evidence and how to obtain the evidence in the investigation transcripts," translated
in WEI Luo, THE CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW AND COURT RULES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 250 (2006).
- v ;4ffljri± [National Library v. Ocean Publishers] (Beijing Haidian District
People's Ct.), discussed in [J 4-A ±{ F-: V [National Library
Suit Against Ocean Publishers Begins, CD Admitted as Direct Evidence], M $1J B 4R [LEGAL
DAILY], Jan. 25, 2002, available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2002-
01/25/content 31052.htm (last visited May 8, 2007).
60 *iiI v. 4,a'j, I/i [Lai Yunpeng v. Beijing Stone Lifang Information
Company, Inc.] (Sup. People's Ct., Mar. 31, 2003), in ZHANG, supra note 49, at 116.
61 f.A v. KN [Xue Yange v. Zhang Nan] (Beijing Haidian District People's Ct.), discussed in
A- t, ,: if VF K % 0 12, R * t , [Xue Yange Sues Zhang Nan for Violation of Rights
Through Impersonation in an e-mail], available at http://www.lusin.cn/ebjichu/law/2006-5-
23/k8429.htm (last visited May 8, 2007).
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could either have been shut down and then started up again at the time
that the e-mail was sent, or left running, permitting a subsequent user to
send an e-mail from the account in question, which were alternative
explanations that the defendant offered in support of her claim that some
unknown third party had sent the e-mail in question.
In still another case, an Internet publisher who had written
assignments of copyrights from authors sued a second publisher for
copyright infringement after he had downloaded the works and published
them in hard copy. 62 The court reviewed e-mails that the defendant
offered into evidence to show copyright assignments that he claimed pre-
dated the written assignments to the Internet publisher. After determining
that that the defendant had not offered enough proof of the authenticity of
the allegedly earlier assignments by e-mail, the court held the defendant
liable.
Although the reasoning in these cases suggests that at least some
Chinese courts are reaching sensible results with only the Evidence
Guidelines to guide them, it is unclear whether these cases are
representative of how Chinese courts generally will handle these issues.
Efforts are underway in China to draft a modem law of evidence which
will provide concrete and constructive guidance to contracting parties,
lawyers and judges with regard to such issues, and the 1999 Electronic
Signature Law now clarifies some questions regarding the admissibility
of certain forms of electronic evidence. 63 However, in the absence of
more detailed legislation establishing clearer standards for determining
the evidentiary value of e-mail and online interactions, significant
uncertainty surrounding the enforceability of online contracts is likely to
remain. Under these circumstances, the reform of China's contract law to
remove formal barriers to the use of electronic media to form contracts
can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for growth of
electronic commerce in China.6
4
62 _h W-itf #41J W -l/ v. +' [ fJlt, [Shanghai Rongshuxia Computers, Ltd. v.
China Society Publishing] (Beijing First Interm. People's Ct., 2000), available at
http://www.ebwh.cn/2004-9/2004928135539.htm (last visited May 8, 2007).
63 tj [Electronic Signature Law of the P.R.C.] Art. 7 (promulgated by
the Nat'l People's Cong. Standing Comm., Aug. 28, 2004) (P.R.C.).
64 RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 458 (2002).
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V. CREATING INCENTIVES FOR THE USE OF ELECTRONIC
SIGNATURES
In 2004, China enacted the Electronic Signature Law. This was
the first P.R.C. law to focus exclusively on electronic commerce issues.
65
It contains many general electronic commerce provisions based on the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce: electronic
communications may meet the statutory requirement that an agreement be
in writing; an electronic file may be an "original" document: and a
document stored and retrieved in a reliable manner may be preserved in
electronic form. It also encourages the use of strong authentication
technology by providing that, if electronic documents are authenticated
using what the law deems to be a highly reliable technology, then that
authentication will be treated as the equivalent of a traditional signature
without any of the uncertainty that surrounds the admissibility of
electronic evidence generally under P.R.C. law. To maintain minimum
levels of reliability for such services, nearly half of the provisions of the
law govern the licensing of organizations that provide electronic signature
services to the public. Outside of China, electronic signatures are rarely if
ever used in either basic or advanced electronic commerce, although their
use is required in several countries as a condition to accessing certain "e-
66government" services. 66 However, the P.R.C. legislation sidesteps the
issue of whether the use of electronic signatures should be required of
Chinese citizens wishing to access public sector services online.
A. Business and Technical Issues
Before the 1990s, trading partners wishing to use advanced
electronic commerce technologies had no alternative but to use expensive,
private networks known as "value-added networks" (VAN) to
communicate. 67 One of the many functions performed by operators of
VANs was the authentication of parties accessing their networks, so
trading parties did not need to worry about whether they were dealing
with their trading partners or some imposter who had assumed that
partner's identity. The high cost of using VANs limited the growth of
electronic commerce, and many businesses finally began using electronic
65 See Zhang Chu & Lei Lingfei, The Chinese Approach to Electronic Transactions Legislation, 9
COMp. L. REV. & TECH. J. 333 (2005).
66 Hermann-Josef Lamberti, Securing Electronic Transactions, ELECTRONIC BANKING L. & COM.
REP., Sept. 2005, at 5.
67 See WINN & WRIGHT, supra note 56, at § 1.04[B].
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commerce only after growth of the Internet dramatically lowered the price
of electronic communications. The Internet was designed to support the
exchange of information between government agencies and research
universities, and its architecture was not designed to provide the security
normally deemed necessary for transaction processing. As a result, the
low price of Internet communications may have obscured the true cost of
using the Internet for commercial transactions because it did not include
the cost of a system to reliably authenticate users.
To meet the needs of businesses engaged in Internet commerce
for a reliable system of authenticating trading partners, as early as the late
1980s, some experts began advocating the use of "digital signature"
technologies within a Public Key Infrastructure" (PKI).68 Some of these
advocates believed that a viable business model existed for issuance of
digital signature certificates by Certificate Authorities (CA), trusted third
parties who would act as intermediaries between Internet trading partners.
Under this paradigm, CAs would review the identity documents of
individuals to ensure that the identity contained in a digital signature
certificate corresponded to the real world identity of the individual using
it, and provide a central registry of certificates that had been revoked.
Digital signature technology has never enjoyed the success some
experts predicted it would in the 1990s because it has turned out to be
more complex, difficult and costly to use than its early proponents had
imagined. 69 While some organizations have been able to make some
aspects of the PKI model work in limited situations, attempts to establish
a general framework for electronic commerce based on this technology
have foundered. 70 This model also provides less security as an
authentication system than anticipated as well. While digital signature
technology can prove that a certain private key had been used to sign a
document, and can make it clear whether a document had been modified
since it was signed, at best it provides only a very partial solution to the
problem of reliably authenticating parties to Internet commerce.71
68 "Digital signature" here refers to a signature formed using asymmetric or public key
cryptography, and PKI refers to a system within which trusted third parties issue certificates binding
a real world identity to a public key. For more information, see Treasury Board Secretariat of
Canada, What is a PKI?, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE, at
http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pki-icp/beginners/whatisapki/whatisapki-e.asp (last visited May 8, 2007).
69 Jane K. Winn, The Emperor's New Clothes: The Shocking Truth About Digital Signatures and
Internet Commerce, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 353 (2001).
70 Simson Garfinkel, Design Principles and Patterns for Computer Systems That Are
Simultaneously Secure and Usable (May 2005) (Ph.D. dissertation, M.I.T.) available at
http://www.simson.net/thesis (last visited May 8, 2007).
71 See, e.g., Carl M. Ellison & Bruce Schneier, Ten Risks of PKI: What You're Not Being Told
About Public Key Infrastructure, COMPUTER SECURITY J., Nov. 1, 2000, at 1-7.
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The shortcomings of digital signature technology can best be
understood with reference to a metaphor: computer security is like a chain
that is only as strong as its weakest link.72 Digital signature technology
hardens specific links in the chain of computer security, but leaves other
links in the chain vulnerable to attack. If digital signature technology is
used without a system for securing the other "links in the chain" of
transaction processing, it does not provide a reliable system for
authenticating online identities. Digital signature technology by itself
cannot secure the hard drive of a personal computer connected to the
Internet, or provide reliable information about who is actually using a
computer to access the private key associated with a particular real world
identity. If the means of creating a digital signature are stored on an
insecure hard drive and can be accessed by entering a password, then all
that is required to make unauthorized signatures is access to the password.
This can be accomplished by surreptitiously loading software that
includes a keystroke logger on the hard drive of the computer together
with spyware that can transmit an intercepted password to a remote
location for later use. The ease with which digital signatures stored on
insecure personal computers may be forged is one reason that businesses
engaged in electronic commerce in developed countries have lost interest
in these approaches as a form of authentication technology.
Another reason that digital signatures are not widely used in
electronic commerce is that, even though it is difficult to bind a person to
an online identity, businesses will not pay for such a service unless it is
bundled with other valuable services, such as a guarantee of payment.73
For independent third parties to offer to check material world identity
documents provided by unknown individuals before issuing online
identity documents, and to form a judgment based solely on such
documentation would be both a very expensive and a very risky business
in which to engage, given that computer imaging technology has lowered
the cost of forging identity documents. The high cost of providing such a
service could be driven higher still if a CA could be held liable for the
amount of a transaction if one of its certificates could later be shown to
have been used by an imposter. Imposing liability for failed transactions
72 See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, America's Flimsy Fortress, WIRED.COM, Mar. 2004, at
http://www.wired.com/wiredlarchive/12.03/view.htmlpg=2 (last visited May 8, 2007) ("Security is
only as strong as its weakest link; three locks on the front door do little good if the back door is
open").
73 Many vendors of digital signature products make their profits from providing electronic signature
functions for closed systems, such as internal corporate information systems, or for providing
certificates for Web servers to support Secure Socket Layer (SSL) security for transactions, which
involves issuing a digital signature certificate to a Web server, not to the merchant operating the
server. Neither of these functions is related to authenticating parties to electronic contracts.
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on CAs under such circumstances in effect turns them into guarantors.
However, no subscriber has ever shown much willingness to pay high
fees to CAs for such broad risk-management services. In light of the low
prices subscribers have been willing to pay for digital signature
certificates, CAs have no choice but to disclaim any liability for
accurately identifying subscribers or for a given subscriber's performance
of the transaction. But if CAs disclaim all responsibility for how their
certificates are used after they are issued, then their services have little or
no value to contracting parties. This mismatch between services CAs can
profitably provide and the needs of transacting parties explains why the
only large PKIs established to date outside of China have been created by
governments, and the certificates are only used when required as a
condition to access e-government services.
Another reason that the conventional PKI business model has not
been widely used in electronic commerce is the mismatch between the
information stored in the certificate and the information needed by
prospective trading parties to analyze the risks created by entering into
the transaction. In transactions between companies, the question of
whether an individual is authorized to act on behalf of a corporation is
more important than the identity of the individual, but digital signature
certificates are normally tied to the identity of an individual, not to that
individual's status within an organization. There are not yet any widely
adopted technical standards governing how information about the scope
of an individual's authorization to form contracts may be communicated
in a digital signature certificate, so trading partners trying to exchange
such information would have difficulty making their systems
interoperable. In addition, the information contained within a certificate
is static and fixed for the duration of the certificate, but the roles played
by individuals in conducting business on behalf of organizations may be
quite dynamic. A certificate is also likely to provide information about an
individual that is not relevant to a transaction, which will have a negative
impact on the privacy of the personal information of individuals acting on
behalf of organizations if there is no way to block the disclosure of some
of the information in the certificate.
When it became obvious to U.S. technology companies that PKI
business models were unworkable, they began work developing
alternative systems. In 2001, a consortium known as Liberty Alliance
was founded by global technology companies such as Sun Microsystems
and Hewlett-Packard. Liberty Alliance has developed a model of
"federated identity management" to support the model of Internet
commerce known as web services. In 2002, another consortium with
similar objectives, the Web Service Interoperability Organization, was
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established by Microsoft and IBM together with other global technology
companies and developed the "WS-*" standards for identity management
systems. The "CardSpace" authentication technology incorporated into
the new Microsoft Windows Vista operating system released in 2006 is
based on the WS-* standards. In 2006, it is still too soon to declare the
efforts of either of these U.S. standard developing organizations to be a
success, industry experts have expressed guarded optimism that they were
likely to have a significant impact within a few years.74
These new identity management systems incorporate elements of
digital signature technologies, but do not use them in the manner
described in the Electronic Signature Law. In a simple form of these new
identity management systems, an individual who wanted to enter into an
online transaction could request that an Identity Provider (IdP) provide an
online Service Provider (SP) with just enough information for the SP to
complete the transaction.75 The IdP would provide the SP with a digital
"token" containing "assertions" of certain facts about the end user that the
SP needs to know in order to decide whether to enter into the transaction.
For example, the token might include assertions that the end user was
over 21, a U.S. resident and can pay for the transaction with a valid credit
card. If the SP knows and trusts the IdP (which might be run by a credit
card issuer, for example), then the SP can decide to authorize the
transaction and receive payment without ever learning the name of the
end user or the credit card number. For the IdP and the SP to have
confidence in the transaction, the SP may use a digital signature to sign its
request for a token and the IdP may sign the token it sends in response.
However, these "signatures" are machine generated and may only
guarantee that the messages originated within the information systems
controlled by the SP and IdP without constituting the signatures of either
organization. Furthermore, the end user may be able to complete the
entire transaction without ever affixing an electronic signature to
anything.
74 See Daniel Blum, Gerry Gebel & Doug Moench, Burton Group Report on the Federal E-
Authentication Initiative (Aug. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.cio.gov/eauthentication/documents/BurtonGroupEAreport.pdf (last visited May 8,
2007); LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, THE IDENTITY PROJECT: AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE U.K. IDENTITY CARDS BILL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS (2005), at
http://is2.Ise.ac.uk/idcard/identityreport.pdf.
71 See generally David Chappell, Introducing Windows Cardspace, MICROSOFT DEVELOPER
NETWORK, Apr. 2006, at http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa480189.aspx (last visited May
8, 2007); Kim Cameron, The Laws of Identity, KIM CAMERON'S IDENTITY WEBLOG (May 2005),
http://www.identityblog.com/stories/2004/12/09/thelaws.html (last visited May 8, 2007).
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B. Technology Specific Digital Signature Laws
Before the shortcomings of digital signatures and PKI business
models became widely known, some lawyers and technologists advocated
enacting laws that would define digital signatures, PKIs, and the role of
CAs.7 6 These laws were intended to clarify the respective rights and
responsibilities of CAs and the individuals to whom they issued
certificates, and provide incentives for the use of digital signature
technologies in Internet commerce. These early laws included
requirements that CAs obtain licenses before issuing digital signature
certificates. They provided that, if a document was signed with a certified
digital signature and the party relying on the signature properly checked
the validity of the signature, the relying party would enjoy a legal
presumption that the digital signature was that of the person identified in
the certificate. The first such law was enacted in 1995 in Utah. Several
other U.S. states followed suit, as well as such countries as Germany and
Italy. These laws that made explicit references to digital signature
technologies were referred to as "technology specific" laws.
Technology specific digital signature laws were criticized on two
grounds: that businesses, not government regulators, should be evaluating
the usefulness of authentication technologies in such a dynamic
environment as Internet commerce; and that, given the limitations of the
technology, they placed too many risks on signing parties. The
subsequent stagnation of PKI business models in every country that has
enacted digital signature laws suggests that it is very difficult for
government regulators to understand market conditions in Internet
commerce well enough to influence the technology choices of contracting
parties. Because storing digital signature keys on the hard drives of
unsecured personal computers connected to the Internet creates a serious
risk that the signature keys can be copied without authorization and used
to make forgeries, the provisions of technology specific laws holding
individuals responsible for unauthorized use of their digital signatures
unfairly allocate the risk of loss from forgeries. This problem was
described in the U.S. in the 1990s as "Grandma picks a bad password and
loses her house. 77
76 See generally Jane K. Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets and the Regulation of Internet
Commerce, 72 TULANE L. REV. 1179 (1998).
77 See, e.g., Jane K. Winn, The Hedgehog and the Fox: Distinguishing Public and Private Sector
Approaches to Managing Risk for Internet Transactions, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 955 (1999); Jane K.
Winn, Couriers without Luggage: Negotiable Instruments and Digital Signatures, 49 S.C. L. REV.
739 (1998).
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During the 1990s, U.S. pundits and policy makers vigorously
debated the merits of technology neutral electronic commerce enabling
legislation, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
Commerce, versus the merits of technology specific legislation. By 1999
and 2000, when the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act and the federal
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act were
drafted, the tide of opinion had turned decisively against technology
specific laws. U.S. legislators concluded that the technology used in
electronic commerce was changing so rapidly and was so complex that
any legislation promoting a specific technology was likely to become an
anachronism and so create inefficiencies by distorting market behavior.
The deference of U.S. law makers to competitive market forces is
consistent with the U.S. tradition of limiting government intervention in
the economy only when intervention is necessary to clear instances of
market failure. The failure of technology specific digital signature laws
in the U.S. was obvious when Utah introduced legislation in 2006 to
repeal its law as an irrelevant anachronism. 78
C. E. U. Electronic Signature Directive
Not all governments are as deferential to market forces as the U.S.
government, however; and many legislators in other countries were
unwilling to wait years to see if reliable technologies to authenticate
Internet trading partners would emerge and achieve widespread adoption
as a result of competition alone. Regulators in the European Union (E.U.)
were put in an awkward position by the fact that some E.U. member
states (Germany and Italy, in particular) were ardent supporters of digital
signature laws, while other E.U. member states (notably the United
Kingdom) believed that legislation in this area was premature and, like
their counterparts in the U.S., were inclined to refrain from legislating in
the absence of incontrovertible evidence of market failure. Germany and
Italy had passed laws based on the Utah law that required CAs to be
licensed before issuing certificates, and E.U. regulators feared that such
licensing requirements imposed by individual member states would create
obstacles to the growth of electronic commerce in Europe as a whole.79
To prevent the European internal market from becoming fractured by
78 Wendy Leibowitz, Utah Will Repeal Its Digital Signature Law, Never Used, as Tech, National
Law Diverged, BNA ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP., Dec. 14, 2005, at
http://ipcenter.bna.com/pic2/ip.nsf/id/BNAP-6KCM2E (last visited May 8, 2007).
79 Jos Dumortier, Legal Status of Qualified Electronic Signatures in Europe in ISSE 2004 -
SECURING ELECTRONIC BUSINESS PROCESSES 281 (Sacher Paulus, Norbert Pohlmann & Helmut
Reimer eds., 2004).
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national differences in electronic commerce legislation, the Commission
developed an Electronic Signature Directive80 to harmonize member state
laws in this area.
When the Electronic Signature Directive was enacted in 1999, it
firmly rejected the requests by some member states to impose licensing
requirements on any organization wishing to offer services to support the
use of digital signature certificates. It tried to diminish the significance of
the split between member states favoring technology specific laws and
those favoring technology neutral laws, as well as to address what had
become by then the better-known shortcomings of digital signature
technology used within a PKI as a system for online authentication. The
Directive provides for three levels of electronic signature:
1. a general notion of electronic signatures which may consist of any
technology the parties choose to use for that purpose;
2. an "advanced" electronic signature which purports to be a
technology-neutral description of a highly secure form of
authentication, but which in reality is merely an abstract
description of a digital signature used within a PKI system;
3. and a "qualified" electronic signature, a digital signature created
with a private key stored on a "secure signature creation device"
consisting of a smart card or some similar means of storing
private key data outside the computer used to sign a document.
The concept of a qualified electronic signature substantially reduces the
risk that "Grandma picks a bad password and loses her house" because
storing the means of creating a digital signature somewhere other than the
hard drive of a personal computer greatly reduces the risk of forgeries.
8
'
The Directive also includes four technical annexes which describe
effective systems for using digital signatures in a PKI. After the
Directive was enacted, the Commission sponsored the work of a standard
development organization, the European Electronic Signature
Standardization Initiative, to develop detailed technical standards
corresponding to the general description provided in the annexes.
The Directive creates modest incentives for businesses to adopt
digital signature technologies by providing that only qualified electronic
80 European Union Electronic Signature Directive, E.U. Directive 1999/93/EC (Dec. 13, 1999), at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/1-013/1-01320000119cna01 20020.pdf (last visited
May 8, 2007).
81 Bruce Schneier, The Failure of Two-Factor Authentication, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY, Mar. 15,
2005, http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/03/thefailure-of.html (last visited May 8,
2007).
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signatures will be treated under law as equivalent to handwritten
signatures. The scope of this incentive will diminish over time because
another directive, the 2002 Electronic Commerce Directive, requires
member states to eliminate any legal obstacles to the use of electronic
contracts. As a result, the number of legal requirements for handwritten
signatures can be expected to diminish over time and eventually to be
eliminated altogether.82 The Electronic Signature Directive is clearly
intended to be technology neutral because it prohibits member states from
imposing any requirements that qualified electronic signatures be used.
However, some member states, such as Germany, have mandated even
higher levels of technological sophistication than those in the Directive,
and require the use of these technologies in connection with the provision
of e-government services.
83
Even though the Directive represented an improvement over early
digital signature laws in several ways, it nevertheless has failed to
promote the use of digital signature technology for electronic commerce
in Europe. In 2003, the study, Legal and Market Aspects of Electronic
Signatures, undertaken on behalf of the commission, was published.84
This revealed that private parties were not using digital signatures to
authenticate each other as part of a process of forming contracts when the
respective parties had had no prior business relationship. 85 Those digital
signatures and certificates that were in use were being used to access e-
government services in those jurisdictions, such as Germany, Austria and
Italy, where their use was a mandatory condition for access to certain e-
government services. In 2006, these findings were echoed by a follow-up
study by the Commission, which found that there was still no evidence
that private parties were using digital signatures to authenticate trading
partners in private transactions. 86 This is true even for businesses in
82 Dumortier, supra note 79.
83 Id.
84 Jos Dumortier et al., The Legal and Market Aspects of Electronic Signatures (2003), at
http://europa.eu.int/information-society/eeurope/2005/all-about/security/electronic-sig-report.pdf
(last visited May 8, 2007).
'5 These results were confirmed in an in-depth study of the impact of the Electronic Signature
Directive in the U.K. in particular. Richard Wilsher & Jane Hill, A Report Prepared on Behalf of
the Department of Trade and Industry Into the Impact in the United Kingdom of the EC Electronic
Signatures Framework Directive, Dept. of Trade & Industry Doc. DTI TFBJ/C/003/006 IX, 2003,
Dec. 12, 2003, at 7 ("[T]he study uncovered a far greater degree of indifference, cynicism and lack
of faith in private sector use of electronic signatures than it did enthusiasm and belief in a
burgeoning market").
86 Report on the Operation of Directive 1999/93/EC on a Community Framework for Electronic
Signatures (Mar. 15, 2006), at
http://ec.europa.eu/informationsociety/eeurope/i2010/docs/single-infospace/com-electronic-sign
atures.reporten.pdf (last visited May 8, 2007).
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countries like Germany and Italy, where businesses have no choice but to
acquire digital signature technology to access certain e-government
services.
D. UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures
Given the well-known shortcomings of digital signature
technology, the persistence of legislators in promoting it is remarkable.
Electronic signature technology appears to be particularly attractive to
those who believe that business practices can be made to conform to law
reforms more easily than law reforms can be made to conform to business
practices, and who also believe that government regulation is less likely
to fail than are markets. Electronic signature requirements also seem to
be popular with regulators who believe that formal, technical legal
requirements, such as signature requirements, impose an important
cautionary obstacle to forming contracts, and that such formalities should
be carried over to online markets where spontaneous, ill-considered acts
may be even easier to perform than similar behavior in traditional
markets. Countries that have such legal cultures and that have actively
promoted the use of digital signature technologies include Germany,
Japan, Singapore and Korea. Countries within the common law tradition
such as the U.S. and U.K. generally have a different legal culture and
tradition of government regulation of the economy, and greater
skepticism about the value of government-led technological innovation,
which makes them less likely to enact laws to promote digital signatures.
During the drafting process, participants were divided on whether
UNCITRAL should promulgate a model law on electronic signatures.
Representatives of countries such as the U.S. and U.K. with relatively
open, flexible attitudes toward the legal proof of signatures, that tend to
be skeptical about the value of legal formalism in certain contexts, and
that were proponents of technology neutral electronic commerce
legislation, opposed the drafting of the model law. Representatives of
many developing countries were unconvinced by arguments that market
forces would eventually lead to the widespread adoption of strong
authentication technology, given that markets operate imperfectly in
many developing countries. They may also have believed that businesses
in their local economies both expect and require clear guidance from
regulators about acceptable behavior in online markets, and that the
absence of such clear guidance would inhibit the growth of electronic
commerce in their domestic markets.
Representatives of the U.S. and U.K. were apparently unable to
persuade the representatives of developing countries that digital signature
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technology was not the "next big thing" in Internet commerce, and so
were outmaneuvered and outvoted in the process of drafting the model
law. They were especially concerned that the UNCITRAL Model Law
provides incentives for the use of "reliable" electronic signatures, but
unlike the EU Directive, does not provide any concrete guidance with
regard to what constitutes "reliable," such as by requiring that digital
signature keys not be stored on the insecure hard drive of a personal
computer. This use of legislative incentives to encourage the use of
digital signatures without any corresponding minimum standards for
reliability increases the risk that unsophisticated subscribers of digital
signature services will be held liable for the actions of hackers. The
efforts of digital signature skeptics from countries like the U.S. to block
the drafting of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures may
have been undermined by the fact that, at the time the law was being
drafted, they could not point to any alternative authentication
technologies that could be seen as effective as digital signatures were
believed to be, and that had achieved acceptance in the market. If new
identity management technologies, such as CardSpace in Windows Vista,
come into widespread use, regulators in developing countries may finally
have convincing proof that markets can produce strong authentication
systems that also respect end user privacy rights, and that such
technologies may not conform to the legislative model of "electronic
signature."
E. P.R. C. Electronic Signature Law
By 2004, when China enacted an Electronic Signature Law based
in large part on the UNCITRAL Model Law, the shortcomings of digital
signature technologies were well known outside China. Developments
outside China may have been less relevant to P.R.C. legislators than
developments inside China, however. It seems likely that the Electronic
Signature Law was intended to regulate the activities of CAs as much as
to provide businesses with access to effective authentication technologies
for online commerce. By the time the law was passed, there may have
been more than 100 CAs operating in China.87 Given the small volume of
electronic commerce being conducted in China today, this seems like a
large number, especially in light of the fact that, outside of China where
electronic commerce is more developed, CAs have a hard time operating
profitably. The large number of CAs operating in China may be a
reflection of the incomplete marketization of the Chinese economy,
87 See Zhang & Lei, supra note 65, at 336.
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however, as many of these CAs may be operated by provincial and local
government units, or by companies established by such units.
Given the dynamic environment for electronic commerce in
China, it is unclear whether China's new Electronic Signature Law will
suffer the same ignoble fate as similar laws enacted in more developed
market economies. Chinese companies trying to use digital signatures in
commercial transactions will face many of the same challenges that
companies in the West have faced. Even after a decade of development,
the lack of standardization among digital signature software applications
makes cross-certification between applications and between organizations
difficult and limits the usefulness of digital signatures in commerce. In
the absence of standards, one way for Chinese businesses to make
effective use of electronic signature technologies would be for all of them
to use software from the same developer, but this strategy has obvious
shortcomings in other areas. If Chinese businesses are unable to agree on
either standards or a single software platform, then Chinese businesses
may find that they have the expense of maintaining multiple electronic
signatures to overcome interoperability problems. Furthermore, Chinese
businesses will need to find ways to overcome the security flaws
associated with the conventional digital signature/PKI model of
implementation without making already serious interoperability problems
worse. If Chinese businesses find that electronic signatures are difficult
and expensive to use and provide few business benefits, they may simply
follow the example of European businesses that have largely ignored the
statutory framework for electronic signatures and invested in whatever
technology they find is best suited to their needs.
VI. CAN CHINA PROMOTE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
THROUGH LAW REFORM?
We recognize technology as the enabler, but the driver
is truly the... customer[]88
The conventional wisdom regarding electronic commerce in
developed market economies is that business objectives must always
remain the "driver" while technology can only "enable" those business
objectives. If managers acquire technology in the mistaken belief that
technological change itself can deliver success in business, they are
8 Debby Hopkins, Citigroup Chief Technology and Operations Officer, quoted in Dan Briody,
Double Duty, CIO INSIGHT, Jan. 5, 2005, available at
http://www.cioinsight.com/article2/0,1540,1753486,00.asp (last visited May 8, 2007).
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usually sorely disappointed. 89 Evidence from developed market
economies as well as from these three case studies of the relationship
between law reform and business behavior in China suggest that
electronic commerce law reforms should also be thought of as only
another enabler rather than as a driver for increasing the use of new
technology by businesses. This mirrors the conventional wisdom in
developed countries regarding the relationship between commercial law
and business behavior. The primary purpose of American commercial
law as it is embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code and as it was
articulated by its principal architect Karl Llewellyn is to facilitate
economic activity by tracking commercial practice rather regulating it. 
9 0
U.S. electronic commerce law reforms have largely continued this model
by focusing on "technology neutral" legislation designed to let the market
determine which technology best enables viable new business models. 9'
The success of the Xu Shi Tiao regulations demonstrates that, under the
right circumstances, this model of law reform can also be effective in
China: market demand for accounting software was released by removing
a legal impediment to its use in a way that promoted fair competition
among software vendors.
Late industrializing countries may not always have the luxury of
letting the market lead when the objective is upgrading local institutions
to make them more competitive in global markets, however. 92  The
mismatch between the abstract terms of the technology-neutral provisions
of China's new Contract Law and the practical challenges that any
business would face in trying to enforce a contract formed using
electronic media in China illustrates the limitations of using law reform
strategies designed to meet the needs of mature market economies in
emerging market economies. In light of China's strategic goal of helping
Chinese industries compete in global markets with superior products and
technology rather than with low-wage labor and lower environmental
standards, it is reasonable to ask whether law reform could be an effective
89 A study of attempts to implement sophisticated electronic commerce technologies by U.S.
businesses revealed that a significant number ended up with higher unit costs after the
implementation than before, which was the opposite of the intended result. Such outcomes usually
reflect a failure to understand thoroughly the business objectives that the technology is capable of
serving, and then target the implementation carefully to take advantage of those features. See
Kanakamedala et al., supra note 14.
90 WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 307 (1973).
91 William J. Clinton & Albert Gore Jr., Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (July 1,
1997), available at http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy/framewrk.htm (last visited May 8,
2007).
92 See, e.g., ALICE H. AMSDEN & CHU WANWEN, BEYOND LATE DEVELOPMENT: TAIWAN'S
UPGRADING POLICIES (2003).
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policy instrument for the P.R.C. government to accelerate the embrace of
electronic commerce by local businesses, even if it is clear that
governments in developed market economies are not doing the same.
93
While increasing the use of basic electronic commerce technologies can
expand China's consumer markets and lower the communication costs of
Chinese businesses, increased use of advanced electronic commerce
technologies can also increase the ability of Chinese businesses to
compete in global markets based on innovation and quality. Law reform
to promote the use of technologies that can in turn help improve
management processes might therefore be one tool that the P.R.C.
government could use to encourage Chinese businesses to move in this
direction, although to date it has been less visible than other law reform
efforts related to promoting technological innovation or WTO accession
such as reform of China's intellectual property laws.
94
Before law reforms to promote electronic commerce can have
much impact on Chinese business strategy, however, it may be necessary
for China to make more progress in its transition to a market economy.
Institutions such as credit reporting agencies and auditors help businesses
in developed market economies search out new potential trading partners
and assess their credibility quickly and for a modest price. Whenever a
business in the U.S. tries to assess the costs and benefits of taking on a
new customer or supplier, one of the first steps in the process is to pull a
credit report on the other business. 95 As a practical matter, non-payment
is perhaps the most common form of contractual breach, so finding a way
to assess the likelihood that a prospective trading partner will fail to pay
after goods or services have been provided is probably the single most
important tool a business needs in order to expand into new markets. The
contribution of private credit information bureaus to the growth of market
93 See, e.g., KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP A. WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1960-1995 (1999); John Ohnesorge, The Rule
of Law, Economic Development, and the Developmental States of Northeast Asia, in LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 91 (Christoph Antons ed., 2003); Donald C. Clarke,
Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89
(2003).
94 See, e.g., Shi Wei, Cultural Perplexity in Intellectual Property: Is Stealing a Book an Elegant
Offense? 32 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1 (2006) (summarizing relationship between China's
recent economic development experience and IPR reform); cf Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does
Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 203 (2006) (IPR piracy has become a
major local industry in China which the P.R.C. government may be unwilling or unable to suppress
for political reasons).
95 See, e.g., Alison Pepper, The Credit-Reporting Process in a Nutshell, ELECTRONIC BANKING L.
& COM. REP., May 2006, at 9.
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economies is recognized in development economics. 96 Although
promoting the growth of credit reporting in the domestic economy is one
element of China's overall strategy for building a market economy,
97
progress since the industry was first established in 1993 has been slow.
98
Access to reliable audited financial statements likewise plays an integral
role in building trust between businesses that have not yet established a
relationship, but will continue to be scarce in China as long as the
shortage of qualified public accountants persists.
99
If Chinese businesses can only obtain the benefits of electronic
commerce - greater efficiency, improved management decision making
and closer cooperation with trading partners - by adopting electronic
commerce technologies designed with sophisticated Western businesses
in mind, then the costs of adopting those technologies may outweigh the
benefits. Just as small and medium sized businesses in developed
economies rarely use advanced electronic commerce technologies, so too
may even large Chinese businesses find them too expensive and hard to
use. 100 The architecture of electronic commerce is evolving rapidly,
however. A newer generation of information technology designed to
streamline and accelerate production and distribution systems is
becoming available.' 0' Chinese firms may be able to achieve significant
efficiency gains more quickly and at lower cost by adopting these newer,
more flexible technologies. If so, then a better target than law reform for
P.R.C. government policy makers might be finding ways to provide
Chinese businesses with access to such technologies. Policies to achieve
that goal might include promoting the growth of local electronic
96 See, e.g., Nataliya Mylenko, Peer Stein, Stefano Stoppani & Oscar Madeddu, Supporting the
Development of Private Credit Information Bureaus, ACCESS FIN., Apr. 2005, available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/gfn.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Fl-CB-AF4-Article/$FILE/FI-CB-AF4-
Article.pdf (last visited May 8, 2007); International Financial Corporation Press Release, IFC to
Support Commercial Credit Bureau for Small and Medium Enterprises in Saudia Arabia, June 27,
2005, available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/pressroom/ifcpressroom.nsf/PressRelease?openform&C9A07166646A372
08525702D0058057E (last visited May 8, 2007).
97 For example, the Beijing municipal government has established Capinfo, a credit reporting
service that operates as a private company. See www.capinfo.com.cn (last visited May 8, 2007).
98 China Steele Business Investigation Center, Due Diligence in China, available at
http://www.china-investigation.com/english/doc5.htm (last visited May 8, 2007); In Brief CHINA
DAILY, Aug. 23, 2005, at 10, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-
08/23/content_471312.htm; Geoff Dyer & Ellen Kelleher, Experian Eyes China Car Market, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at 26.
99 Jopson, supra note 8.
10o See generally GIBB & DAMODARAN, supra note 36.
101 Id. See supra text at note 36 for a discussion of the move away from rigid EDI towards more
flexible XML standards.
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commerce technology software developers and service providers, 10 2 and
developing standards to lower the cost of implementing such technologies
and achieving interoperability.
0 3
There is evidence that the Chinese government recognizes the
importance of standards in promoting the growth of electronic commerce.
In 2003, the Ministry of Science and Technology formed a strategic
alliance with RosettaNet, a standard-developing organization that has
produced a comprehensive set of XML standards for electronic
commerce, to create an advanced electronic commerce portal for Chinese
businesses to use with foreign trading partners. 10 4  However, because
RosettaNet was originally designed to meet the electronic commerce
needs of sophisticated, high-technology companies, it may be
prohibitively expensive for small and medium-sized enterprises in
developed countries or firms in developing countries. 105 Particular
attention was paid to the needs of enterprises in developing countries
during the development under the auspices of the UN of the ebXML
standards for advanced electronic commerce, but these standards may
never gain the necessary critical mass of adoptions by software
developers; some of their original sponsors have withdrawn support for
them. 106 Given the size of the Chinese domestic market and the
sophistication of some leading Chinese technology companies and
102 Such a policy would be related to other policies, such as reform of IPR; see, e.g., Li Yahong,
Pushing for Greater Protection: The Trend Toward Greater Protection of Intellectual Property in
the Chinese Software Industry and the Implications for the Rule of Law in China, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 637 (2002).
103 Such a policy would be related to other policies, such as reform of China's system for
developing standards; see, e.g., Scott Kennedy, The Political Economy of Standards Coalitions:
Explaining China's Involvement in High-Tech Standards Wars, ASIA POL'Y, July 2006, at 41,
available at http://nbr.org/publications/asia-policy/AP2/AP2_Kennedy.pdf (last visited May 8,
2007); Zhao Chaoyi & John M. Graham, The P.R.C. 's Evolving Standards System: Institutions and
Strategies, ASIA POL'Y, July 2006, at 63, available at
http://nbr.org/publications/asia.policy/AP2/AP2-Zhao.pdf (last visited May 8, 2007).
104 Thor Olavsrud, RosettaNet, P.R.C. to Open China Affiliate, INTERNETNEWS.COM, Sept. 17,
2003, at http://www.intemetnews.com/dev-news/article.php/3078661 (last visited May 8, 2007).
105 See, e.g., Shuvranshu Pokhariyal, New Technologies Bring RosettaNet to Smaller Businesses,
INTEL DEVELOPER UPDATE, Sept. 2001, available at
http://www.intel.com/technology/magazine/computing/it09015.pdf (last visited May 8, 2007)
("RosettaNet is a complex standard that until now has been expensive to implement. In fact, current
RosettaNet solutions can cost millions of dollars, hindering the proliferation of e-Business").
106 John Markoff, Microsoft Quits a UN. Standards Group, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2004, at C4.
Microsoft and IBM may have withdrawn their support for ebXML, an open standard, because they
hoped that technologies based on their proprietary technologies or standards over which they had
more influence, would succeed instead. See, e.g., Martin LaMonica, Microsoft Walks Out On Web
Services Standards Group: Joins IBM in Private Dance Outside W3C 'Choreography' Group,
SILICON.COM, Mar. 25, 2003, at
http://software.silicon.com/webservices/0,39024657,10003461,00.htm (last visited May 9, 2007).
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research universities, the P.R.C. government and Chinese businesses
could play a critical role in developing standards to support the "right
sizing" of advanced electronic commerce technologies for use by less
sophisticated Chinese domestic businesses as well as by local businesses
in other developing countries. Increasing the availability of inexpensive
technologies that can be used effectively without first requiring an
overhaul of existing management systems is likely to have a greater
impact on Chinese businesses' adoption of advanced electronic commerce
technology than further law reforms. Widespread use of such systems
might also make it possible for Chinese businesses to rely less on P.R.C.
legal institutions and more on information technology as a regulatory
mechanism. 10
7
VII. CONCLUSION
The most important incentives for Chinese businesses to adopt
electronic commerce technologies are likely to come from the market, not
from law reform. It may be possible under certain circumstances for law
reform to play an important role in removing obstacles to the greater use
of electronic commerce technologies by Chinese firms, or to correct
market failures that make it difficult for Chinese firms to compete in
global markets. The Xu Shi Tiao appear to be an example of a law reform
that did both successfully. Furthermore, once the objectives of
government intervention had been accomplished, the requirement that
accounting software be certified compliant prior to distribution was
discontinued, reducing the role of regulation in the market for software.
Recent Chinese law reforms based on international model
legislation appear likely to be less successful than the Xu Shi Tiao. The
electronic commerce enabling provisions in the 1999 Contract Law may
be too general to provide much certainty to local businesses concerned
about the enforceability of electronic contracts. If anxiety about the
enforceability of contracts formed using electronic media is inhibiting the
use of electronic commerce technologies by Chinese businesses, Chinese
courts may need much more specific guidance than that available in the
Contract Law to assess the probative value of electronic records offered in
contract disputes. Even if the Contract Law provisions have little impact
on the rate of adoption of electronic commerce technologies by Chinese
'07 See generally, Jane K. Winn, The Impact of XML on Contract Law and the Volume of Contract
Litigation, Nov. 2005, available at
http://www.idealliance.org/proceedings/xm105/ship/ 15/contractjlitigation.HTML (use of advanced
electronic commerce technologies by U.S. businesses appears to suppress the rate of litigation
among such businesses).
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businesses, at least they are unlikely to distort the market for such
technologies.
The prognosis for the 2004 Electronic Signature Law is less
promising because it promotes the use of a technology that is not widely
used outside China. Although the Electronic Signature Law was intended
to be technology neutral, in reality, it is closely tied to the use of a
specific form of authentication technology. It remains possible, however,
that that the law will enjoy more success in China than similar laws
enacted in developed market economies have because of idiosyncratic
conditions in the Chinese economy.
While three case studies is an inadequate basis to form a theory of
how law reform can effectively promote technological innovation in
commerce, the results of these case studies suggest the limitations of
using law reform to promote the growth of electronic commerce during a
period of transition to a market economy. Effective use of electronic
commerce could help China achieve its goal of becoming a leading
innovator in global markets by helping Chinese businesses compete more
effectively in global markets. It might also help Chinese businesses
transcend the limitations of China's incomplete transition to a market
economy by supporting the growth of economic institutions linked
directly with trading partners. While it will be difficult for P.R.C.
regulators to find the right mix of policy instruments to promote greater
use of electronic commerce technologies by Chinese businesses, law
reform informed by concrete knowledge of current conditions in the
domestic economy combined with finding ways to make appropriate
technology more accessible could play a significant role.
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